“Language has lost all its meaning in the universal cant. Representative government is really misrepresentative. . . . Manifest Destiny, Democracy, Freedom, fine names for an ugly thing. They call it otto [attar] or rose and lavender––I call it bilge-water.”
–Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Speech on Affairs in Kansas”
“There is a relation between the hours of our life and the centuries of time” (113), Emerson remarks in the inaugural essay in the First Series, “History.” His argument that we need to learn the art of reading history “actively and not passively” is the germinal idea behind Emerson’s understanding of history and social reform.
The proposition that most of what we know is not fixed but fluid was unsettling in Emerson’s time––as well as in our own. “I unsettle all things,” Emerson writes. “No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I simply experiment, an endless seeker with no Past at my back.” And in Circles, “Nothing is secure,” writes Emerson, “but life, transition, the energizing spirit. People wish to be settled; only as far as they are unsettled is there any hope for them.”
What it really means to “live amid hallucinations,” to use Emersonian phrase, is to live a life in transition––to know that our knowledge is incomplete and that one of the joys of life is to pursue the incompleteness at the core of Emerson’s proposition. When he says at the end of “History” that a person is “a bundle of relations, a knot of roots, whose flower and fruitage is the world,” he means precisely what he says. The active and dynamic relation of self and world implies an understanding of what we know as provisional––constructed and reconstructed by the mind in perpetual interaction with itself and the world.
For Emerson, we read history to know our selves. To read sympathetically, and to read morally, is Emerson’s way of reminding his readers of the obligations of history. But to know our selves is to understand that any mediation on freedom or justice, any affirmation of a liberal democracy, must begin in the soil and with the roots. Here is a passage from the essay Fate in which he is thinking through the consequences of Manifest Destiny, and in particular the question of race:
The population of the world is a conditional population not the best, but the best that could live now; and the scale of tribes, and the steadiness with which victory adheres to one tribe, and defeat to another, is as uniform as the superposition of strata. We know in history what weight belongs to race. We see the English, French, and Germans planting themselves on every shore and market of America and Australia, and monopolizing the commerce of these countries. We like the nervous and victorious habit of our own branch of the family. We follow the step of the Jew, of the Indian, of the Negro. We see how much will has been expended to extinguish the Jew, in vain. Look at the unpalatable conclusions of Knox, in his “Fragment of Races,” — a rash and unsatisfactory writer, but charged with pungent and unforgettable truths. “Nature respects race, and not hybrids.” “Every race has its own habitat.” “Detach a colony from the race, and it deteriorates to the crab.” See the shades of the picture. The German and Irish millions, like the Negro, have a great deal of guano in their destiny. They are ferried over the Atlantic, and carted over America, to ditch and to drudge, to make corn cheap, and then to lie down prematurely to make a spot of green grass on the prairie.
The race question was central in Emerson’s time. He had read Robert Knox’s The Races of Men and was familiar with other nineteenth-century accounts of the idea of race. When these lines cited above are fully contextualized in the history of Emerson’s time, as one of Emerson’s readers, Eduardo Cadava writes, it is difficult not to read them as referring to the violent history of American colonization and imperialism. “For they put before us the violence, the inequality, the economic oppression, and colonialist and racist exclusions that affected, and continue to affect, so many human beings in the history of not only America but the earth” (The Other Emerson 106).
The question that Emerson raises in the first passages of Fate is “how shall I live?” might be answered, then, by acknowledging that we might choose to become more aware of the of the “illusions” or the “hallucinations” that insulate us from what Emerson calls the “guano” in the history and destiny of human beings. This is the central argument of a book by the writer Barry Lopez, The Rediscovery of North America, I am reading with another group of students this semester. Lopez speaks to the need to develop a recognition, much like what Emerson is calling for, of a historical and material and spiritual and psychological dimension of geography—of the place where we find ourselves, as Emerson might say. It follows that any (Emersonian) meditation on freedom and justice, or any endorsement or affirmation of the ideals of liberal democracy, must begin with the (violent) history of colonization.
What emerged late in the nineteenth-century, and persisted through the middle of the twentieth century, was an understanding of Emerson’s life and work as disengaged from the social and political and moral questions of his time. What we now know, and can now read in his writing, is the nature of Emerson’s engagement. In An Address on the Emancipation of the Negroes in the British West Indies (348–59 in Norton) and Address to the citizens of Concord on the Fugitive Slave Law (359–72 in Norton) Emerson makes the case for what he calls in the Concord address a “Higher Law.” His belief in a moral universe that transcends existing laws begins in the idea that there are unjust laws. In other words, as he says at the opening of his essay Politics,
In dealing with the State, we ought to remember that its institutions are not aboriginal, though they existed before we were born: that they are not superior to the citizen: that every one of them was once the act of a single man: every law and usage was a man’s expedient to meet a particular case: that they all are imitable, all alterable; we may make as good; we may make better.
Emerson believes in the fluidity of institutions based on the conviction that they are constructed or made. The expediencies of laws led Emerson’s quarrel with Daniel Webster, for example, who supported the Fugitive Slave Law to preserve the Union. What Emerson sees and is willing to make visible is that the law is a product of the materialism Emerson abhorred. The institution of slavery was perpetuated (both in the South and in the North) by the expediency of sustaining economy; and material prosperity and individual comforts are valued more than social justice. Emerson’s dissent is clear: morality is not subordinate but primary. As he says of institutions (including slavery): “all are imitable, all alterable; we may make as good; we may make better.” As Emerson wrote elsewhere, “If resistance to this law is not right, there is no right.”
Photo credit: Mark C. Long